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Abstract 
The Large Hadron Collider at CERN, the European Organisation for Nuclear Research, is the 
world’s highest-energy particle accelerator. Its construction (1995-2008) required frontier 
technologies and close collaboration between CERN scientists and contracting firms. The literature 
on “Big Science” projects suggests that this collaboration generated economic spillovers, 
particularly through technological learning. CERN granted us access to its procurement database, 
including suppliers of LHC from 35 countries for orders over 10,000 Swiss Francs. We gathered 
balance-sheet data for more than 350 of these companies from 1991 to 2014, which include the 
years before and after that of the first order received. The study assesses, in quantitative terms, 
whether becoming a CERN supplier induced greater R&D effort and innovative capacity, thus 
enhancing productivity and profitability. The findings – which controlled for firms’ observable 
characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, and unobserved time, country, industry and firm-level 
fixed effects – indicate a statistically significant correlation between procurement events and 
company R&D, knowledge creation and economic performance. The correlation is chiefly driven 
by high-tech orders; for companies receiving non-high-tech orders, it is weaker, or even statistically 
not significant. 
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1. Introduction   
“Big Science” projects are expensive and the ultimate social impact of discovery is hard to 
predict, especially where basic research is concerned (Martin and Tang 2007; Bornmann 2012, 
2013; Godin and Dorè 2012). It may take decades to understand how knowledge of fundamental 
features of nature could be of any practical use, and in the meantime governments are expected to 
support investment in science in hopes of highly uncertain social returns. But there also exist 
immediate benefits that are observable even during the construction of a large research 
infrastructure (Salter and Martin 2001). Some of these benefits stem from unprecedented 
technological challenges in meeting the exacting standards of cutting-edge experimental devices 
that demand close collaboration between laboratories and firms in the supply chain of machines that 
serves for scientific discovery. Such collaboration may generate learning effects that spill over from 
basic research as a positive externality to firms thanks to procurement contracts. Technological 
learning can help firms generate and process innovation and ultimately increase their growth 
opportunities (Turner, 2015). 
We have studied this effect in relation to CERN, the European Organisation for Nuclear 
Research. CERN is the world’s leading particle physics laboratory and its role and impact have 
been extensively studied by economists, from the three papers of Martin and Irvine (1984a, 1984b, 
1984c) to more recent work by the OECD (2014). CERN hosts the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), 
where the Higgs boson was discovered in 2012. The LHC, built between 1993 and 2008, consists of 
a 27-kilometer underground ring between Switzerland and France. Particle beams are collided at 
four points where detectors are located, each of which is operated by an experimental 
“collaboration”, a team involving CERN staff as well as scientists from universities and research 
institutes from various countries. In their observations, the four detectors produce enormous 
amounts of data per second that is transmitted to a series of computing nodes around the world, 
which are connected through the worldwide LHC computer grid. The LHC is indeed, like the title 
of  L.R. Evans’ book, a “marvel of technology” (Evans, 2009).              
The technological features of the LHC are extremely demanding. CERN, its collaborators, 
and firms with procurement contracts have had to closely cooperate to solve entirely new problems 
in a series of fields, including superconductivity, cryogenics, electromagnets, ultra-high vacuum, 
distributed computing, rad-resistance materials, and fast electronics (Evans 2009; Giudice, 2010). 
The large number of suppliers, the international scope of procurement, the wide range of sectors, 
and the duration of the construction process offer an ideal setting for our central research question: 
namely, how best to measure the economic impact of technological procurement on the 
performance of suppliers in Big Science.    
In fact, when the introduced innovation is so radical as to constitute a discontinuity, it may generate 
technological advances that pervade many sectors and have a protracted impact on the entire 
economic system. Such innovations, described as “General Purpose Technologies” (GPTs), have 
been investigated, among others, by Bresnam and Trajtenberg (1995), Helpman (1998), and Janovic 
and Russeau (2005). The World Wide Web, invented at CERN in 1989, in addition to being perhaps 
the most famous example of technological spillover from Big Science, is a notable example of GPT 
breakthrough. 
More in general, there is clear, albeit unsystematic, evidence that the firms working for CERN have 
learned new solutions and then developed new products for other customers outside of the scientific 
field  (see for instance Amaldi 2012; Nielsen and Anelli, 2016). Examples in the medical sector 
include hadrontherapy (Battistoni et al., 2016) and the new open source software “TIGRE” 
(Tomographic Iterative GPU-based Reconstruction) for PET scanners. As regards transportation, 
one of CERN's suppliers for ultra-high vacuum technology was able to partner with Hyperloop 
Transportation Technology, a company that is developing a very high, even ultrasonic, speed 
transport system thanks to the know-how and experience that was acquired while working on the 
LHC1. “VESPER” (Very energetic Electron facility for Space Planetary Exploration missions in 
harsh Radiative environments) found application in the aerospace industry. The potential 
applications of “KRYOLIZE”, a novel cryogenic software for sizing relief valves that protect 
against overpressure, also interest the food industry. Superconductivity, a core feature of the 
magnets developed to steer the LHC particle beams, may find application in various fields, ranging 
from medicine, with “particle therapy,”2 to aerospace, with hybrid propulsion systems, to 
agriculture, with fruit sorting machines, to energy, with Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) 
systems3 (see Aschauer et al. 2017). 
Three different approaches have been taken to gauging the economic effects of 
technological learning stemming from a procurement relationship with large basic research 
infrastructures (Salter and Martin 2001; Hall et al., 2010; Autio et al, 2004): case studies, surveys, 
and input-output or other aggregate statistical methods. Detailed case histories provide interesting 
qualitative insights into suppliers’ learning effects and subsequent commercial developments 
(Arenius and Boisot, 2011; OECD, 2014). Case studies on the impact of research have been used 
extensively in the U.K. as part of a unique assessment exercise including 7,000 case studies (Van 
Noorden, 2015).  
                                                          
1 https://kt.cern/success-stories/hyperloop 
2 “Particle Therapy” is a variant of radiotherapy that irradiates tumor tissue with protons and light ions (Aschauer, 2017: 15). 
3 “UPC systems are devices for energy storage that can deliberately take on and deliver power when necessary” (Aschauer, 2017: 
2). 
 
Surveying stakeholders is another helpful approach. A survey of CERN suppliers (Autio, 
2014) found that collaboration with CERN was instrumental to product innovation, new R&D, 
starting a new business unit, or opening a new market, and that more than 40% of the respondent 
firms reported that after the contract they were more internationalised and had benefited from 
technological learning. The average combined value of suppliers’ sales to other clients and cost 
savings was reported to be three times the amount of the CERN order. Florio et al. (2017) report the 
findings of a recent survey of over 600 CERN suppliers, confirming lasting effects on performance, 
organisation, and behaviour.  
Finally, aggregate statistical approaches have been adopted for decades to study the effects 
of scientific programs ranging from NASA (Bezdek and Wendling, 1992) to biotechnology (Webb 
and Whyte, 2009). Typically, input-output tables of average national or regional inter-industry 
linkages and investment multipliers were used to compute the impact of research spending by an 
agency or project on GDP or productivity.   
All three approaches are informative, but none provides a true empirical measurement, 
strictly speaking, of the direct effects of procurement on suppliers: case studies, with their specific 
histories, are unavoidably heterogeneous in method, including narrative and other qualitative 
approaches; surveys of company managers provide some statistical evidence but are likely to be 
affected by self-selection as well as respondents’ judgment and memory; input-output models and 
other aggregate econometric approaches heavily depend on certain macroeconomic assumptions 
(Macilwain, 2010), in that they apply average output and employment multipliers that are used for 
the entire economy, which may or may not be relevant for contracting firms in Big Science projects.  
Our empirical strategy is  innovative: we consider  the procurement contract between a firm 
and its client, i.e. the institution that manages the research infrastructure, as an event whose effects 
can go beyond the immediate impact (i.e. the first order received) to change the firm’s performance 
over time, even net of confounding factors such as macroeconomic conditions. In this perspective, 
we apply firm-level panel microeconometrics to study the long-run effects of CERN procurement 
on suppliers’ R&D activity, knowledge production, productivity, and - ultimately - profitability. 
This approach is replicable for any other Big Science project in principle. 
CERN granted us access to the LHC procurement data from 1995 to 2008. There were 1296 
suppliers with at least one order of over SFR 10,000, for a total of 11,969 orders. Orders went to 
firms in 35 different countries including China, Japan, Russia, and the United States, but over 99% 
of the orders, based on their value, were placed with European firms, mostly in CERN member 
states, which are preferred in CERN procurement. We recorded the location, year, order value, and 
activity code of each supplier. We then classified each order on a technology intensity scale.   
 From the original list of LHC suppliers (which included other laboratories, joint ventures, 
etc.) we selected those whose core financial indicators were available in a public database 
(Amadeus or Orbis) for the 1991-2014 period, which is a sufficiently long time to empirically test 
the impact of the procurement contracts. We also wanted to identify patents that had been filed by 
the same firms by using the Patstat database. Some 360 companies satisfied these criteria, giving us 
a sample that produced from 3300 to 5800 observations, depending on which dependent variable 
was considered.   
Our hypothesis is that becoming a CERN supplier may induce more intensive effort in R&D 
and knowledge creation, leading to improvements in productivity and profitability, especially for 
high-tech suppliers. We build on the framework of Crépon et al. (1998),  augmented by the impulse 
variable, consisting in the date of the first order by CERN. 
To test the chain of consequences from the procurement event, our causal variable, to the 
sequence of R&D investments, patent filing, productivity gains and - ultimately - higher 
profitability, as a first step we built a set of single-equation empirical models where we test whether 
a CERN procurement effect is detectable at each step of  the logical chain. After controlling for firm 
characteristics, such as assets and other size variables, time and country-fixed effects (as well as 
industry ones when appropriate), and macroeconomic factors, we found that being an LHC supplier 
is correlated with yearly changes in our empirical proxies for each item in the logical chain. CERN 
orders are correlated with changes in suppliers’ intangible assets, increases in the number of patent 
filings, changes in labour productivity, and ultimately increases in longer-term revenue and 
profitability. The estimated coefficients of this “CERN effect” are statistically significant for the 
whole sample but higher for high-tech firms. As expected, in line with the intuitions implied by the 
surveys reported by Autio (2014) and Florio et al. (2017),  in most cases the coefficients are not 
significant for firms receiving orders for “off-the-shelf” products. 
As a second step, following the most recent developments of the literature (see e.g. Hall and 
Sena 2017; Van Leeuwen and Mohnen, 2017) we estimated our model as a system of simultaneous 
equations. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and introduces our 
conceptual framework and hypotheses. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 describes the 
empirical strategy: section 4.1 defines the single-equation regression models, while section 4.2 
introduces the system of simultaneous equations. Section 5 presents the estimation results,  while 
section 6 tests them through several robustness checks, and section 7 concludes with a discussion of 
the findings and their policy implications.  
 
 
 2. Earlier literature and the conceptual framework 
In this section, we briefly review some relevant strands of literature. First, we recall the Arrow-
Solow mechanism of learning externality through problem-solving (2.1). Then we cite some 
evidence of spillovers from universities and public research centers to firms (2.2) and public 
procurement for innovation (2.3). Finally, drawing on these earlier studies, we formulate our own 
research question and working hypotheses (2.4).  
 
2.1 Learning spillovers: concepts and measurement 
Learning spillovers are externalities that stem from non-rivalrous and partially excludable 
knowledge creation (Griliches, 1979; Romer, 1990; Foray, 2004).  To cite Kenneth Arrow’s 
seminal thesis: “Learning is the product of experience. Learning can only take place through the 
attempt to solve a problem and therefore only takes place during activity. … [L]earning associated 
with repetition of essentially the same problem is subject to sharply diminishing returns” (Arrow, 
1962, p. 155). 
In our context, the key concept here is “attempt to solve a problem,” insofar as basic 
research infrastructures (RIs) pose unprecedented problems to the firms that construct them. The 
formal model initially proposed by Arrow, which posited increasing returns to cumulative gross 
investment, was instrumental in creating an endogenous theory of growth in macroeconomics, but 
the thesis of learning-by-doing ultimately depends on microeconomic, firm-level mechanisms. 
Thompson (2010) reviewed some of the empirical literature and concluded that passive learning 
was not as important as had been expected and that other mechanisms were therefore presumably at 
work. Irwin and Klenow (1994), in a study of the semiconductor industry, concluded that under 
normal market circumstances of cumulative knowledge accumulation, learning spillovers may be 
limited (see also Nemet, 2012, on wind power projects).  
Solow (1997) expanded Arrow’s original model to comprise discontinuous innovation 
arising from experience related to new investments. For a firm, solving a new problem requires 
more R&D investment and innovation. Product and process innovation then spurs productivity and 
may generate changes in output prices and profit margins through the Schumpeterian mechanism of 
temporary monopoly. Several theoretical models of innovation based on this mechanism have been 
proposed (Stokey, 1988, for one). 
Two main methods have been employed to estimate the magnitude of R&D spillovers from 
an empirical perspective. The “technological flow” approach positions firms or industries within a 
matrix of technological linkages, using either input-output or technology matrices based on patent 
data. The spillovers from the R&D activities of one firm/industry onto  others are examined (see 
among others Terleckyj, 1974 and 1980, and Scherer, 1982 and 1984). The “cost function” method 
is an econometric approach, estimating the impact of spillovers on the cost and production structure 
of the receiving firms/industries (see e.g. Bernstein, 1988, and Bernstein and Nadiri, 1991). For an 
extensive review of studies using these two alternative procedures, see Nadiri (1993).  
 
2.2 Spillovers from  research centres and universities 
According to Bernstein and Nadiri (1991), in the case of private firms’ relations with non-market 
organisations, such as universities and research centres, the learning spillovers are enhanced. As 
CERN is both a publicly funded institution and a research hub for thousands of academics through 
collaborations, a relevant strand of literature is that on the transmission of knowledge to firms in 
this context. The seminal paper of Jaffe (1989) empirically demonstrates the existence of spillovers 
from university research to business innovation that measured by corporate patents. The beneficial 
side-effects of academic research are also found in business start-ups (Bania et al., 1993) and high-
technology innovations (Anselin et al., 1997). Mansfield demonstrated that a significant portion of 
firms’ product and process innovation in the U.S. would have been impossible, or at least 
substantially delayed, in the absence of university research (Mansfield 1991, 1998). And the closer 
firms are to major academic research centres, the greater the benefits will be (Mansfield and Lee, 
1996).  More recently, Helmers and Overman (2017) have discussed the correlation between 
proximity to the Synchrotron Diamond Light Source in the U.K. and the productivity of academic 
research. Publicly funded basic research at universities does not substitute private R&D, but rather 
stimulates and enhances it (Nelson and Rosenberg, 1994). Studies showing a significant 
contribution of academic research to economic growth include Bergman (1990) and Martin (1998). 
The following different types of contribution to growth are identified by Salter and Martin (2001): 
increase in the stock of information, new instrumentation and methodologies, skilled graduates, 
professional networks, technological problem-solving, and the creation of new firms. Starting from 
this taxonomy, our focus is mainly on technological problem-solving and new instrumentation.  
 
2.3 Public procurement and innovation 
Procurement is a possible source of learning that stems from discontinuous innovation in the 
Arrow-Solow acceptation, as information between the contracting parties ex-ante is never 
symmetrical and requires a delicate balancing of risks and incentives (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). 
Procurement itself has accordingly been described as a learning process (Newcombe, 1999), and 
public procurement, in particular, has been studied as a driver of innovation (Edquist et al., 2105; 
Edquist and Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, 2012). Edquist and Hommen (2000, pp. 5) defined public 
procurement for innovation (PPI) a situation in which “a public agency places an order for a product 
or system which does not exist at the time, but which could (probably)  be developed within a 
reasonable period. Additional or new technological work is required to fulfill the demand of the 
buyer.”  
Public procurement is also considered as an important demand-side innovation policy 
(Aschhoff and Sofka, 2009; Martin and Tang, 2007), particularly when the development of 
sophisticated products is required (Salter and Martin, 2001). For this reason, the role of PPI in 
promoting radical innovations (including General Purpose Technologies) is relevant in economic 
fields characterised by high risk that cannot be borne entirely by the private sector (Mazzuccato, 
2016). A concrete example concerns Swedish military jets (Eliasson, 2010, 2011): the development 
of a new aircraft involved a complex network of suppliers and close public-private cooperation, 
leading the aircraft industry to become a “technical university” where continuous learning occurs. 
PPI has a positive effect on firms’ R&D investment, with a demand-pull effect that is greater than 
that of other private contracts (Litchtenberg, 1988) and is a possible completion/addition/accessory 
or even an alternative to supply-side policies (Edler and Georghiou, 2007). Guerzoni and Raiteri 
(2015) show that PPI has a major impact on firms’ expenditure in innovative activities that is 
stronger than that of R&D subsidies and tax credits.  
The context of procurement contracts for large-scale research infrastructures is considered by 
Autio et al. (2003) and Purton (2015). Important insights are also offered by Salter and Martin 
(2001); for a more general discussion see Stephan (1996) and Price (1984). For qualitative case 
studies, see inter alia Fahlander (2016) on the impact of two accelerators (HIE-ISOLDE and ESS) 
on local firms, Pero (2013) on three accelerators for material science (Elettra Synchrotron in 
Trieste, ESRF synchrotron in Grenoble, and XFEL in Hamburg), and  OECD (2014) with a specific 
focus on LHC magnets, a core feature of the accelerator that is discussed in some detail by Rossi 
and Todesco (2009), and hadron therapy (Battistoni et al., 2016). 
For approaches to measuring the socio-economic impact of RIs through input-output 
modeling or other aggregate methods, see HAL Innovation Policy Economics (2013) on the 
TRIUMF particle physics laboratory in Canada, and Garcia-Montalvo and Raya (2010) on the 
ALBA synchrotron in Barcelona.  
Previous research on the economic repercussions of CERN procurement mainly drew on 
surveys of suppliers. This literature stressed industrial knowledge spillovers (Schmied, 1977; 
Bianchi-Streit et al., 1984; Autio et al., 2003; Autio et al., 2004; Autio, 2014) and considered the 
important role of CERN itself as a risk-taker in the realisation of complex scientific projects 
(Unnervik, 2009). Autio et al. (2003) was based on a survey of 154 suppliers (1997-2001), 
representing around half of CERN’s total procurement budget in those years. The main findings are 
the following: 38% of the suppliers designed new products, 13% created new R&D teams, 14% 
created a new business unit, 17% entered new markets, 42% reported increased international 
operations, 44% reported technological learning, and 36% said there was market learning. Previous 
research at CERN (Bianchi-Streit et al., 1984) related to the construction of the SPS accelerator 
(1963-1987) was also based on interviews with suppliers (160 out of 519 providing high-tech 
components). It was found that the “utility ratio” (increased revenue + cost savings)/(procurement 
value) was in the range of 3:1, meaning that each franc that was spent by CERN in procurement 
generated three francs worth of additional value to the suppliers. Aberg and Bengtson (2015, 2016), 
in two recent papers, critically examine the CERN procurement process as an innovation driver, 
based on about 100 interviews. Florio et al. (2017) update the survey methodology by means of a 
Bayesian Network Analysis of the outcomes of being a CERN supplier for over 600 firms (their 
findings are compared with ours in the concluding section). Qualitatively interesting as they may 
be, all these contributions depend on surveys of firm managers, which may be affected by 
respondents’ self-selection and possibly subjective bias. 
 
 2.4 Research question and hypotheses 
We framed our research question and working hypotheses in the light of this relevant literature. 
CERN operates as a “learning-environment” for its suppliers and poses new problems to be solved 
as well as, potentially, an Arrow-Solow discontinuity. Our aim is to conduct an empirical test, 
controlling for firm-specific and context-specific effects, of whether this environment actually 
produces measurable effects on suppliers’ innovation outcomes and economic performance – as is 
widely acknowledged by earlier studies using the qualitative, narrative, case-study and managerial 
survey approaches.  
The logic underlying this question follows the chain of events highlighted by Crépon et al. 
(1998), which singles out firms’ research activity as a determinant of innovation output, which in 
turn impacts on productivity.4 We extended this framework by introducing procurement, which we 
posit as the trigger that influences firms’ R&D, innovation, and productivity at the beginning of the 
chain and ultimately leads to gains in revenues and profitability. Thus the full sequence of events 
we tested is:  
Procurement relation increase in R&D   innovations productivity growth change in  
revenues and profitability  
                                                          
4 We thank  an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
 In other words, we applied empirical proxies to investigate the impact of procurement on 
firms’ knowledge production and innovation capacity (section 5.1) and on their economic 
performance, gauged by productivity and profitability (section 5.2).  
Within  this framework, we tested two straightforward hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Receiving an order from CERN enhances suppliers’ knowledge production 
and innovation outcomes, measured through R&D effort and patents. 
Hypothesis 2: Becoming a CERN supplier increases firms’ performance in terms of 
productivity, revenue and profits,  regardless of the initial order.   
As the assets required by the RI are of varying technological intensity, a second question is 
whether the effect we are looking for is correlated with the high-tech intensity of the order, i.e. with 
the knowledge embodied, possibly through a cooperative R&D effort, formal or informal, between 
the RI and the supplier firm’s staff, as suggested by Autio et al. (2003). We expect any learning 
mechanism to be more closely correlated with the performance of firms meeting high-tech orders 
(i.e., those that require a certain degree of problem-solving, as per Arrow-Solow) and less with that 
of suppliers of off-the-shelf products.  
However, another possible explanation for the correlation between subsequent sales and 
procurement relationship involves a reputation effect. One might expect that, in terms of marketing, 
the quality of the product or the reliability of the firm can be evinced simply by having been 
selected by a prestigious customer like CERN. For example, suppliers of staples to royal houses 
(which are supposedly selective in terms of quality) advertise this fact to increase their visibility (in 
the U.K., for example, there are over 680 Royal Warrant holders “by appointment of HM The 
Queen”). If there is a pure reputation effect for CERN suppliers, we should find that not only firms 
supplying new products, but also those supplying standard ones, benefit. Accordingly, if the 
technological or market learning effect mainly works for high-tech suppliers, and reputation or 
other generic effects work for all of them, we should find a positive correlation between profits and 
procurement events in both cases, with a stronger one for high-tech suppliers, given the presumed 
cumulative effect of two drivers.  
This lead to the formulation of a further, complementary hypothesis for testing: 
Hypothesis 3: The correlation between procurement events and firms’ subsequent 
performance is stronger for suppliers of high-tech orders than for those of non-high-tech orders.  
Clearly, these three hypotheses collapse a complex story into a set of simple propositions, 
while the actual behavioral change within a firm may be more nuanced. For example, some 
innovations may stem from organisational changes and managerial adjustments spurred by the 
firm’s exposure to the CERN environment, as some managerial surveys suggest (particularly Autio 
et al, 2003, Florio et al., 2017). However, these more complex qualitative effects are best captured 
by case studies or surveys, whereas our objective is to produce a quantitative estimate of the 
average CERN effect on suppliers; for this reason, some simplifying hypotheses are necessary.   
 
3. The data 
Our main source of firm-level data is the CERN Procurement and Industrial Services (PI) 
Group (http://procurement.web.cern.ch/procurement-strategy-and-policy), the team in charge of 
coordinating all the supplies and services that the laboratory needs. Experimental collaborations, 
such as ATLAS and CMS, have some procurement autonomy, so their orders are not covered here, 
except when they are directly managed by CERN. The PI team regularly monitors and reports all 
supply activities to management and CERN member states (MS). The PI makes or authorises major 
purchases, with three main objectives: (i) to make sure that contracts satisfy technical and financial 
requirements; (ii) to keep costs as low as possible; and (iii) to achieve balanced industrial returns for 
member states. Ensuring a certain distribution of contracts among MS is crucial: a strong political 
push to institute a mechanism to guarantee a “fair return” on investments for all MS resulted in the 
approval of a set of procurement rules in 1993 (Åberg and Bengtson, 2015; CERN, 1993a,b). 
Depending on their type, contracts are awarded on either a “lowest compliant” or “best value for 
money” basis.  However, “lowest compliant” contracts for  over SFR 100,000 are subjected to a 
further requirement, namely the overall achievement of “well-balanced industrial return 
coefficients” for MS. A country is considered to be in line if its return coefficient – i.e. the ratio of 
its percentage of the value of all contracts in the course of the preceding four calendar years to its 
percentage contribution to the CERN budget – is above a certain threshold. CERN has various tools 
to ensure well-balanced returns, such as “limited tendering” and “alignment” (see CERN, 2015: 37-
42). The former restricts the tender to MS with very low return coefficients, while the latter gives 
priority to firms in poorly-balanced countries with less than their balanced share of contracts. 
In 2015 and 2016 the CERN PI provided us with several extracts from the full dataset of orders 
for the construction of the LHC. The considered period is 1995-2008, i.e. before the accelerator 
started operating regularly. Only orders over SFR 10,000 were included, as we wanted to exclude a 
welter of marginal suppliers for which knowledge or reputation/generic effects are unlikely.  
The original LHC procurement dataset we received contained 1296 suppliers. We were able to 
identify 1060 of them in the Orbis and Amadeus databases. Some are not recorded by Orbis because 
they are other research institutes, such as the Russian Academy of Sciences, consortia, or other 
organisations that do not publish their accounts. Furthermore, we need the accounting data for 
periods before and after the procurement event, and for some companies data dating back more than 
twenty years are not available. National laws on corporate balance-sheet disclosure also vary. For 
example, Swiss companies, which accounted for 30% of our initial sample of CERN suppliers, are 
not subject to any legal requirement to release their accounting data, and no financial data on any of 
them are available in Amadeus or any other public repository. Similarly, German firms seldom 
report information on their balance sheets. Visual inspection of procurement data and interviews to 
CERN staff suggest that firms for which financial data are not available do not differ systematically 
from those with adequate data in ORBIS. Nevertheless, by filtering the initial sample on this basis, 
we managed to create a subsample of 365 companies about which an adequately long financial 
history is available.   
Figure 1 shows the distribution over time of the orders that were assigned in the restricted 
sample, as well as the number of new suppliers and initial procurement events, which is our variable 
of interest, as it marks the starting point of firms’ collaboration with CERN for the LHC project.  
 
Fig. 1 – Yearly distribution of LHC procurement orders, first-time orders to a supplier and 
new suppliers in our sample 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on CERN data. 
 
Each of these first-time orders, which are our initial events, marks the beginning of a potential 
learning process and/or reputation effect for a specific firm. This is our variable of interest, modeled 
as a simple binary code taking value 0 before and 1 after the year of the first order (further on, we 
also apply other definitions as a robustness check). The subsequent time profile is informative: the 
average number of years in which a company received at least one order is 2.2 (standard deviation 
1.87, with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 11 years). This implies that the direct impact of the 
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orders on company profitability could not last more than 2 or 3 years, on average. However, we are 
interested in economic effects stretching beyond these initial years. The first-year events in our 
study are evenly spread between 1996 and 2007 (unlike the total orders, which peak in 2003-2005). 
Around 90 new suppliers were involved in the LHC in any of the 12 years considered.  
This empirical analysis exploits the fact that, unlike most event studies, we have not one, but 
a sequence of twelve “before-after” events. For example, a company entering the CERN 
procurement system in 2000 can potentially be observed for 10 years before the event (including 
2000), and 14 years after (as we have financial data from 1991 to 2014). For a company entering in 
one of the last groups, e.g. 2007, we have potentially 7 years of observations “after” and 18 years 
“before” the event.  
    Over 90% of the LHC suppliers in the original CERN database are located in six countries: 
France, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, the U.K. and Spain. In our final sample, the majority also 
come from these countries, with the important exception of Switzerland, which is not represented, 
for the reason cited above. In our sample, suppliers are located in 18 different countries, all in the 
European Union. France is by far the most heavily represented (53.4% of the total), followed by 
Italy (14%), the U.K. (8.2%), Spain (5.8%) and Germany (4.4%).5  
As previously pointed out, our sample only comprises CERN suppliers whose financial data 
are available in the Amadeus or Orbis databases, the former covering only European and the latter 
also non-European companies. Moreover, although our final sample consists solely of European 
firms, a few turned out to be reported in Orbis but not in Amadeus, so we decided to use both 
sources. Using these two databases, we searched for six company performance variables between 
1991 and 2014, namely: intangible assets, number of patents filed, sales per employee (proxying for 
productivity), and three profitability measures, EBIT (Earnings before Interest and Taxes), 
operating revenue, and the EBIT margin, i.e. EBIT over operating revenue.  
Two of the companies (ENEL and Electricitè de France) are evident outliers in size, as 
measured by sales, revenue, EBIT or total assets so we excluded them from the sample.6 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for explanatory and dependent variables in regressions. 
Patents obtained from Patstat comprise a much larger number of observations than financial 
variables, because Patstat has data on all 1060 companies in our original dataset, while the financial 
variables are missing from many observations. The statistics refer to companies that reported 
relevant financial information at least once. Ultimately, however, we also had to drop suppliers that 
did not report financial data both before and after the year of the initial procurement. Clearly, 
                                                          
5 The other countries are:  Finland (2.74%, 10 companies), Belgium (2.19%, 8), Sweden (1.64%, 6), the Czech Republic and the 
Netherlands (1.37%, 5), Denmark and Portugal (1.1%, 4), Austria (0.82%, 3), Poland and Slovakia (0.55%, 2), Bulgaria, Ireland and 
Russia (0.27%, 1). 
6 Including them in the econometric analysis, however, does not noticeably change the results. 
exclusions reflect the lack of different variables, and as a consequence our company samples vary 
with the dependent variable estimated.7 Here we present statistics for the entire sample, but these 
considerations also hold for each of the various analysed samples.   
As is often the case with accounting data, the nominal variables exhibit a heavily skewed 
distribution, reflecting the standard pyramid structure of the industry sector. However, the “EBIT 
margin” variable, as a ratio, is immune to this problem: the median values are not far from the 
means, revealing a rather symmetrical distribution.  
As regards patenting, 69.3% of the companies (732 out of 1060) did not file any patent during 
our sample period, which explains the low mean and nil median given in Table 1, thus justifying the 
use of count data models when “patent count” is the dependent variable, as is standard in the 
literature (see e.g. Hall et al., 1984; Aghion et al., 2013). 
The analysed macroeconomic variables are yearly GDP growth and inflation in the supplier’s 
country.8 On the demand side, GDP growth may affect our outcome variables, for faster growth 
presumably increases the demand for all goods, and hence firms’ sales and profits. Inflation 
(measured by the consumer price index)  controls for price changes that may affect the real value of 
our performance indicators (which are in nominal terms), given the long time span covered and the 
fact that all Orbis and Amadeus data are in current euros and at current exchange rates. 
 
Table 1 - Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Std. Dev. Median Observations 
Total Assets9 (‘000, €) 354,229 2,353,854 6,842 9,670 
Intangible Fixed Assets10 (‘000, €) 49,619 551,680 22 9,209 
Tangible Fixed Assets 11(‘000, €) 68,697 671,275 719 8,740 
Number of Employees 1,333 7,459 70 9,152 
Sales (‘000, €) 306,309 1,615,202 10,701 7,770 
Operating Revenues (‘000, €) 273,064 1,495,048 10,942 10,092 
EBIT (‘000, €) 15,602 134,956 313 8,616 
EBIT margin 4.67% 11.58 4.25% 8,250 
Patents 0.247 1.53 0 25,296 
 
 
                                                          
7  A company may report information both before and after the initial procurement year only in reference to some of the financial 
variables and not others. To avoid reducing the sample size excessively, we preferred to work with slightly different samples rather 
than limit ourselves to only analysing companies with no missing values in any of the outcome variables. 
8 Source of data: World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
9 Orbis/Amadeus definition: “Sum of fixed assets (intangible fixed and tangible fixed) and current assets” 
10 Orbis/Amadeus definition: “All intangible assets such as formation expenses, research expenses, goodwill, development 
expenses and all other expenses with a long term effect”. 
11 Orbis/Amadeus definition: “All tangible assets such as buildings, machinery, etc”. 
 4. The Empirical Strategy  
In the last 20 years, the CDM model has been extended and further developed in several 
directions by many authors. See Lööf et al. (2017) for a review of such development. 
The original CDM framework included a structural model where research investment 
explained innovation output, which in turn affected productivity. The proposed generalisations and 
extensions concern the nature and the measure of input and outcome variables, the inclusion of 
additional equations in the model, new estimation methods, different types of data (from cross-
sectional to panel), dynamic specifications of the model and different fields of application. 
Following the standard CDM framework, Baum et al. (2015) estimated the R&D-innovation-
productivity relationship as a Generalised Structural Equation Model. This approach enables the 
entire CDM model to be estimated as one system using a full-information maximum likelihood 
estimator, allowing coefficients to differ across sectors and taking cross-equation error correlation 
into account. The same type of estimator is employed by Raymond et al. (2015), which integrates 
dynamics into the R&D-innovation-productivity relationship including lagged values of the 
dependent variable in each of the equations composing the system. Their results show a causal 
impact of innovation on productivity and reveal strong persistence in firms’ productivity. 
One of the most significant developments of the CDM framework, namely Hall and Sena 
(2017) introduces an initial estimation step to model the firm’s decision to invest in innovation and 
the intensity of such expenditure. They also consider legal protection of intellectual property as a 
crucial external institution, modeling the relationship between appropriability mechanisms, 
innovation and firm productivity. Using a sequential 2SLS estimation procedure, they find that 
innovation, combined with the formal protection methods of intellectual property, tends to deliver 
the best productivity outcome. From a similar perspective, Van Leeuwen and Mohnen (2017) apply 
the CDM model to the field of green innovation. Using a structural approach, they investigate 
relationships linking environmental regulation, eco-investments, eco-innovation and labour 
productivity. They find a positive and significant impact of environmental regulation on eco-
investments and eco-innovations. Resource-saving eco-innovations, in turn, increase productivity. 
We test our hypotheses by following two alternative approaches. First, we considered the 
impact of CERN procurement on each of the outcome variables highlighted in the chain of logical 
implication described in section 2.4 to investigate the direct effects of procurement. This is done by 
estimating six different single-equation regression models, which are presented in section 4.1. Then, 
following the recent literature presented above, we moved to a system of simultaneous equations to 
better capture the mediated impact of procurement and the complex relations linking it to company 
economic performance. Specifically, we estimated a four-equations system where the dependent 
variables are: company R&D effort, the annual number of filed patents, productivity and economic 
performance. The details of this estimation strategy are discussed in section 4.2.  
4.1 Single-equation regression models 
We compared the values of six different outcome variables for each firm before and after the event, 
exploiting our time-variant sequence of events. In our setting, this approach represents a version of 
a difference-in-difference panel (see Angrist and Pishke, 2009, for a methodological discussion, 
particularly section 5.3 and appendix 5.4), given that we do not have just one before/after year, but 
twelve such breaks, each involving different firms. In our context, at the beginning of the period 
(1991), no firm is a CERN supplier for the LHC, and at the end of the period all the sample firms 
are. In the intervening years, we have a sustained sequence of events (from 1995 to 2008), with the 
firms’ status shift occurring in different years. Hence we were able to use a panel data approach, 
including (in most years) both treated and non-treated firms, where fixed effects capture unobserved 
firm-specific heterogeneity that is constant over time and year dummies capture unobserved effects 
that should affect all firms equally (e.g. business cycle, national and international economic policy, 
oil shocks). Alternative estimation strategies are discussed later. 
In this context, our general approach was to estimate the effect that receiving an order from 
CERN had, over time, on the firms’ outcome variables, controlling for firm characteristics, the 
macroeconomic situation, and time, country and firm fixed effects. Alternative specifications, with 
industry rather than firm fixed effects, were also considered. The “CERN effect” is a dummy 
variable that takes value 0 before the first year the company received an order from CERN and 1 
thereafter. 
We considered a static panel data model specification in which both performance and firm-
level control variables are taken in changes year by year, to avoid spurious regressions (see Granger 
and Newbold, 1974; Box and Jenkins, 1970). 
Specifically, the general empirical model we estimated is: 
∆𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + ∆𝑋′𝑖𝑖𝛾 + ∆𝑍′𝑐𝑖𝜃 + 𝜎𝑠 +  𝛿𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐 + 𝛿𝑖𝜌𝑐 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖                                             (1) 
where ∆𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the relevant outcome variable (see below) taken in first differences for firm i at 
time t. 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represents the relevant explanatory variable, the capability to deliver an order to 
CERN.  ∆𝑋′𝑖𝑖 is a vector of firm characteristics, mainly reflecting company size, which may 
influence the firm’s ability to capture technology spillovers.  
 ∆𝑍′𝑐𝑖 is a vector of macroeconomic controls, including ∆𝐺𝐺Pct, the yearly percentage change of 
GDP in the firm’s country c, and ∆𝛽PIct, the yearly percentage change in that country’s CPI. These 
variables control for country-level macroeconomic effects due to overall output and price changes. 
𝛿𝑖 denotes time-fixed effects, while 𝜎𝑠 and 𝜌𝑐 are time-invariant unobservable industry- and 
country-specific fixed effects respectively.12 Finally, 𝑢𝑖𝑖 is the random error term, which is 
clustered by country, allowing for error correlation within the same country. 
It is important to note that the resulting estimate of the consequences of procurement is 
conservative since it evaluates the impact on company outcomes from the year the first order is 
received, when it is plausible that this impact might be even greater in subsequent years, since some 
outcomes may take time to change.  
Starting from the general specification in equation (1), we estimated four different equations, 
reflecting the logical chain of events set forth in the conceptual framework (section 2.3): R&D asset 
value (2), knowledge production (3), productivity (4) and profitability (5).  
The R&D value equation takes the following specification: 
∆𝛽&𝐺𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆′𝑖𝑖𝛾1 + 𝜃1∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑖 + 𝜃2∆𝛽𝐺𝐶𝑐𝑖 + 𝜎𝑠 +  𝛿𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐 + 𝛿𝑖𝜌𝑐 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖              (2) 
where the R&D effort (∆𝛽&𝐺𝑖𝑖) is proxied by the yearly variation of Intangible Fixed Assets per 
employee, ∆ � 𝐼𝐼
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
�
𝑖𝑖
. For recent examples and a discussion on the matter/equation, see  Marin, 
2014; Leoncini et al., 2017.  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is a vector including the yearly change in number of employees 
and either the yearly change in Tangible Fixed Assets (TFA)13 or a set of dummy variables for firm 
size,14 ranging from a small to very large (reference category). 
The second step in the sequence is the estimation of a knowledge production equation: 
∆𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆′𝑖𝑖𝛾1 + 𝛾2∆ �𝐼𝐼𝑇𝐼�𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃1∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑖 + 𝜎𝑠 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖                   (3) 
where ∆𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is the number of patents filed by company i in year t.  𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 is a vector including 
the yearly change in number of employees and either the change in Total Assets or the set of 
dummy variables for size in equation (2). In view of the well-documented relationship between 
R&D and patents (see e.g. Hall et al., 1984), we control for the variable ∆ �𝐼𝐼
𝑇𝐼
�
𝑖𝑖
, which represents 
the yearly change in the share of Intangible Assets in Total Assets. Since the dependent variable 
here is non-monetary, inflation was  dropped from the macroeconomic controls. 
The productivity equation takes the form: 
                                                          
12 Clearly, when models are estimated using fixed-effect regressions, vectors σs and ρc are omitted. 
13 Unlike the subsequent equations, this one does not include Total Assets, which by definition includes Intangible Assets, our dependent variable. 
14 These dummy variables are constructed starting from the “size” variable in Orbis, which classifies companies as very large, large, medium and 
small on the basis of number of employees, total assets and operating revenue.  
∆𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑆𝑃𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆′𝑖𝑖𝛾1 + 𝛾2∆𝛽&𝐺𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾3∆�𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑝𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 �𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃1∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑖 + 𝜃2∆𝛽𝐺𝐶𝑐𝑖 + 𝜎𝑠 +  𝛿𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐 + 𝛿𝑖𝜌𝑐 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖          (4)                                                               
where the yearly change in sales normalised by the number of employees, ∆ �𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑠
𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
�
𝑖𝑖
, is used as a 
proxy for labour productivity (see e.g. Raimond et al., 2015). The vector 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 includes the yearly 
change in number of employees and either the yearly change in Total Assets or the usual set of size 
dummies. 
Finally, as the last link of our chain of implications for testing, we estimated the following 
performance equation: 
∆𝐺𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑖
𝑗 = 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆′𝑖𝑖𝛾1 + 𝜃1∆𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑖 + 𝜃2∆𝛽𝐺𝐶𝑐𝑖 + 𝜎𝑠 +  𝛿𝑖 + 𝜌𝑐 + 𝛿𝑖𝜌𝑐 + 𝑢𝑖𝑖                             (5) 
where the superscript j identifies the three different measures of performance that we use: j=EBIT, 
Operating Revenue and EBIT margin. The vector 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 considers either the yearly change in Total 
Assets or the set of size dummies. 
In this setting, a pooled OLS regression would result in biased estimates of the vectors of the 
coefficients, owing to the potential correlation between unobservable, time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics and the set of explanatory variables (Cameron Trivedi, 2005). Accordingly, we 
estimated the models using a fixed-effect (FE) estimator that captures the impact of time-variant 
variables. The FE estimator enables us to control for time-invariant differences between 
observations, eliminating potential bias due to the omission of fixed unobserved firm-specific 
variables such as management quality, corporate governance, reputation, and the like. Moreover, 
the results of the Hausman Test (reported below) also suggest that, given our data, the FE estimator 
tends to be the best. Nevertheless, we also ran a robustness check on it by performing RE 
regressions to control for time-invariant industry characteristics.  
A correlation matrix for the variables included in the analysis is available in the Appendix. As 
expected, larger firm size (in terms of assets and number of employees) is strongly correlated with 
higher revenues, sales and earnings. However, there appears to be no relevant problem of 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables that were used as regressors.  
4.2 System of simultaneous equations 
Until now, we have considered each of the equations underlying the chain of logical 
implications stretching from the event of becoming a CERN supplier to an increase in company 
revenues and profitability as single regressions. This was done to better clarify the impact that 
procurement may have on each of the considered outcome variables. Indeed, this strategy allows the 
direct impact of procurement on firm innovation outputs, productivity and economic performance to 
be highlighted. 
 At this point, we went one step further by estimating our model as a system of simultaneous 
equations. The standard CDM model was augmented by means of an initial trigger provided by the 
CERN commissioned procurement. This is done by adding the (time-varying) dummy variable 
“CERN effect” to the R&D equation. In addition to productivity, earnings and profitability are 
investigated in the fourth equation of the system. 
Since there are endogenous variables on both the left and right sides of each equation, the 
system was estimated by using a 3SLS procedure (see Zellner and Theil, 1962). Moreover, the 
3SLS estimator allows for cross-correlations in the residuals of the equations in the system and is 
thus more efficient than 2SLS (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005).  
Unlike the single-equation approach, this strategy allows better appraisal of the mediated effect 
of CERN procurement and so more precisely highlights the complex linkage between procurement 
and economic performance.  
Specifically, the system of equations we estimated is the following: 
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ ∆R&Dit = β1CERNit + Size′itγ1 +  θ1∆GDPct + φ1∆CPIct + σs + δt + ρc + uit
∆Patentsit = β2R&Dit + Size′itγ2 +  θ2∆GDPct + σs + δt + ρc + eit
∆Productivityit =   β3∆patentsit + Size′itγ3 +θ3∆GDPct + φ3∆CPIct + σs +  δt + ρc + εit
∆Performanceitj = β4∆Productivityit +  Size′itγ4 + θ4∆GDPct + φ4∆CPIct + σs +  δt + ρc + ϵit        (6) 
where the variable “Patent” is linearised using the transformation ln(1+ patents)15, thus allowing 
the “knowledge production” equation to be estimated in the framework of a linear system. 
 
5. The Results 
5.1 The CERN effect on R&D and knowledge production 
Tables 2 and 3 report the coefficient estimates of the parameters in equations (2) and (3).  
The results for equation (2) suggest that after becoming CERN suppliers companies increased their 
intangible investment. This is consistent with the hypothesis that technological procurement boosts 
R&D expenditure. We are aware that intangible fixed assets are an imperfect measure of R&D 
spending, but Orbis and Amadeus provide no R&D data for more than 90% of the firms, while they 
include R&D asset value in intangible fixed assets. Moreover, as we shall see below, the case for 
this proxy is further supported by the fact that this link is only found for suppliers of high tech-
                                                          
15 Taking log-transformations of patent count is a common practice in the literature investigating the determinants of patenting: see for example 
Zhao et al. (2017), Li (2012) and Aghion et. al (2013). 
orders (we present the results in section 5.3). Table 2 suggests that our results are robust to 
alternative specifications, which include different size controls and time-varying fixed effects.16 
Since Intangible Fixed Assets is normalised by number of employees, the coefficient of their yearly 
change (∆Employees) estimates the deviation from constant returns to firm size (see Crépon et al. 
1998). 
Table 2 – Impact of CERN procurement on R&D effort (proxied by ∆Intangible Assets/employees)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ∆R&D ∆R&D ∆R&D ∆R&D 
CERN 0.925** 1.164*** 1.254*** 0.425*** 
 (0.332) (0.257) (0.249) (0.115) 
∆Employees (mln) -1.99*** -1.99*** -2.00*** -0.0341 
 (0.107) (0.111) (0.107) (0.0427) 
∆TFA/Employees (mln)    0.0206 
    (0.0395) 
size_very_large 0.0868 0.290 0.492  
 (0.850) (0.889) (1.006)  
size_large -0.429 -0.329 -0.181  
 (0.641) (0.581) (0.548)  
size_medium -0.242 -0.239 -0.193  
 (0.598) (0.558) (0.526)  
     
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years No Yes Yes Yes 
Years*Country No No Yes Yes 
     
Cons -0.246 -0.377 -0.350 -0.522 
 (0.540) (0.857) (0.576) (0.447) 
R2 0.083 0.083 0.085 0.047 
N 3893 3893 3893 3488 
FE regressions  
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
The positive effect of CERN procurement also emerges in the yearly change in filed patents, which 
increases after the beginning of the procurement relationship (Table 3). The current ratio of 
intangible to total assets has a positive and highly significant coefficient, whereas with a one-year 
lag the ratio is significant in only one of our two specifications; this suggests that the increase in 
intangible assets reported in Table 2 contributes to innovation capacity. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the CERN effect remains positive and significant at the 1% level 
even with these additional controls, meaning that the benefits of procurement presumably go 
beyond the direct impact of increased R&D activity. This suggests that technological spillovers may 
well constitute a positive externality. Part of the R&D cost of developing a new product 
commissioned by CERN is of course defrayed by CERN itself, but CERN does not patent the 
                                                          
16 In the following tables, we only report the most complete specification where both year and year*country fixed effects are included.  
inventions, allowing the supplier to do so and thus to exploit the new process/product developed in 
the course of the collaboration. 
The specifications in columns (7) and (8) include firm fixed effects among the explanatory 
variables, using the “pre-sample mean scaling” method of Blundell et al. (1999). Thanks to Patstat’s 
long data series on companies’ patenting behaviour, we were able to compute the pre-sample 
average of patents, which should reflect the “entry level innovation knowledge stock” (Blundell et 
al., 1999, p. 534), i.e. the stock of past innovations available to each company at the beginning of 
our period in 1991, which can serve as an initial condition to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Table 3 – Impact of CERN procurement on innovation output (proxied by patents)  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents 
         
CERN 0.372* 0.558*** 0.543*** 0.794*** 0.565*** 0.790*** 0.558*** 0.802*** 
 (0.209) (0.216) (0.211) (0.196) (0.217) (0.220) (0.207) (0.194) 
∆Employees (mln) -0.0181 -0.0533 -0.0152 -0.0547 -0.0140 -0.0486 -0.0151 -0.0547 
 (0.0158) (0.0384) (0.0163) (0.0394) (0.0157) (0.0386) (0.0163) (0.0395) 
∆Total Assets (bln)  0.123  0.145  0.121  0.145 
  (0.107)  (0.113)  (0.113)  (0.113) 
size_very_large 4.373***  4.170***  4.069***  4.168***  
 (1.013)  (1.018)  (1.032)  (1.017)  
size_large 2.908***  2.738***  2.589**  2.721***  
 (1.013)  (1.018)  (1.033)  (1.018)  
size_medium 1.411  1.272  1.061  1.273  
 (1.018)  (1.024)  (1.038)  (1.023)  
∆(IA/TA)   2.188** 3.685***   2.198** 3.698*** 
   (0.953) (1.047)   (0.959) (1.050) 
∆(IA/TA)_lag1     0.354 1.813*   
     (0.937) (1.045)   
GDP_growth 0.0197 0.0289 0.0612 0.0908* 0.0651 0.0980* 0.0604 0.0904* 
 (0.0453) (0.0505) (0.0485) (0.0533) (0.0507) (0.0553) (0.0487) (0.0534) 
         
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
         
Cons -3.938*** -0.722 -3.782*** -0.890 -20.52 -18.34 -3.773*** -0.889 
 (1.423) (1.240) (1.373) (1.275) (14.78) (12.40) (1.371) (1.275) 
N 5278 5278 4660 4660 4326 4325 4660 4660 
Negative Binomial regressions 
Column (6): fixed effects controls using the Blundell et al. (1999) pre-sample mean scaling estimator. 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
5.2 CERN effect on performance: productivity, revenue and profitability 
As regards Equation 4, the Orbis/Amadeus data are unfortunately insufficient to estimate changes in 
total factor productivity by any of the usual econometric methods, which would shrink our sample 
drastically. However, a positive correlation emerges between LHC procurement and firms’ labour 
productivity, a productivity gauge commonly used in the literature (see e.g. Raimond et al., 2015). 
As Table 4 shows, this result is robust to alternative specifications. As expected, the coefficients of 
Intangible Assets and number of patents are positive and statistically significant, but even when 
they are included in the regression, the beneficial impact of procurement persists.  
 
Table 4 - Impact of CERN procurement on productivity (proxied by ∆sales/employees) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆Productivity ∆Productivity ∆Productivity ∆Productivity ∆Productivity ∆Productivity 
CERN 13.65** 12.61* 12.47** 12.05** 12.34*** 11.92** 
 (6.671) (6.597) (4.299) (4.698) (4.334) (4.687) 
∆Employees (mln) -20.67*** -19.97*** -18.29*** -18.18*** -18.31*** -18.19*** 
 (1.367) (0.728) (0.884) (1.257) (0.884) (1.262) 
∆Total Assets (bln) 8.153  1.064  1.082  
 (14.95)  (13.48)  (13.50)  
size_very_large  112.1  135.6  135.7 
  (78.53)  (89.96)  (90.02) 
size_large  82.54  103.1  103.1 
  (60.94)  (67.95)  (68.00) 
size_medium  -3.868  3.237  3.249 
  (15.67)  (19.09)  (19.06) 
∆R&D   0.750** 0.761* 0.745** 0.756* 
   (0.329) (0.363) (0.331) (0.366) 
∆(Patents/Empl)     74.27** 76.00** 
     (32.03) (27.88) 
       
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years*country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cons 14.65*** -53.41 10.01*** -59.09 11.66*** -57.94 
 (2.120) (33.73) (1.148) (35.07) (1.095) (34.89) 
R2 0.284 0.294 0.327 0.317 0.326 0.322 
N 3659 3659 3328 3328 3320 3320 
FE regressions 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
The final link in our chain of implications is the relationship between procurement and firms’ 
revenue and profitability (Equation 5). The estimation results suggest that LHC procurement has a 
positive and highly significant impact on the change in revenue, EBIT and EBIT margin (Table 5). 
As is demonstrated in the following section, this result is mainly driven by high-tech suppliers 
whose CERN effect coefficient is always strongly significant for all performance variables, whereas 
for non-high-tech providers it is often not significant.  
If Intangible Assets and patent filings are included in the regression, their coefficients are not 
statistically significant,17 while the CERN effect is practically unaffected in both magnitude and 
significance. 
 
 
                                                          
17 This result holds whether the two variables are included jointly or separately. 
Table 5 - Impact of CERN procurement on economic outcomes: Revenue, EBIT and EBIT margin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆OR ∆OR ∆EBIT ∆EBIT ∆EBITm ∆EBITm 
CERN 31139.1*** 45596.1** 4942.5** 5999.5** 0.854*** 0.838*** 
 (7867.5) (18373.5) (2500.5) (2365.0) (0.326) (0.325) 
∆Total Assets (bln) 340457.8***  25239.0***  -0.175  
 (15386.7)  (4747.9)  (0.353)  
size_very_large  8655.2***  295.0  1.678 
  (1945.6)  (455.9)  (1.529) 
size_large  -867.1  1440.6  1.777 
  (2750.6)  (1099.6)  (1.423) 
size_medium  -1022.1  77.91  1.780 
  (1795.0)  (431.2)  (1.467) 
       
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years*country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cons -32100.1*** -30830.7*** -2017.2*** -2531.8*** -0.961*** -3.313** 
 (789.1) (2621.4) (92.84) (359.4) (0.0143) (1.456) 
R2 0.491 0.085 0.133 0.114 0.012 0.011 
N 5799 5799 5812 5812 5771 5771 
FE regressions  
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
5.3 High-tech vs. non-high-tech suppliers 
To determine whether the technological features of procurement influence company 
performance, we split our sample between high-tech and other suppliers, analysing each subgroup 
separately.  
In order to assign suppliers to one group or the other, we took advantage of the fact that in the 
original database CERN orders are classified by an “activity code” identifying each product type 
with a highly detailed 3-digit level. We used the 2-digit classification, which covers around 100 
items and was sufficiently detailed for our purposes. In some cases, we also inspected the 3-digit 
classification to better interpret the technological content.  
After a preliminary analysis of the overall distribution of order codes, we followed Florio et al. 
(2016) in identifying the specific activity codes most likely to be associated with high-tech goods 
and services for the construction of the LHC. In some instances the code descriptors were generic 
(“28-Electrical engineering,” say, or “45-Software”). To minimise classification errors, we sampled 
300 orders for a more in-depth analysis. These orders were placed with 207 different suppliers, 16% 
of all those who received at least one order for the LHC during the period under analysis. The 
orders thus sampled were then evaluated in detail by CERN experts and classified, according to 
their technological intensity, along a five-point scale designed to capture differences in both product 
specificity and closeness of the supplier’s collaboration with CERN:  
Class 1: most likely “off-the-shelf” orders of low technological intensity;  
Class 2: off-the-shelf orders with average technological intensity;  
Class 3: mostly off-the-shelf but usually high-tech and requiring some careful specification;  
Class 4: high-tech orders with moderate to high intensity of specification activity to customise 
products for the LHC;  
Class 5: products at the technological frontier, with intensive customisation and co-design 
involving CERN staff. 
We defined high-tech codes as Classes 3, 4 and 5 and then divided the LHC suppliers into two 
broad groups, according to their opportunity to deliver high-tech orders in the initial procurement 
event. According to the activity code assigned to the first order, 63% of our sample companies are 
part of the high-tech category, with a very slight over-representation of around 2 percentage points 
in relation to the original CERN data (61%). There is some risk of misclassification, in that non-
high-tech companies may have gained the ability, over time, to satisfy high-tech orders, and that 
many companies received more than one order, which are not necessarily all coded alike. However, 
the data indicate that the first order is generally a good predictor of the technological intensity of 
subsequent ones.  
As noted earlier,  longer term profits and profit margins respond to procurement only for high-
tech suppliers, which seems to confirm that the determinants of the benefits generated by LHC 
procurement include specific learning spillovers and innovation (see Table 6). For operating 
revenue, however, the difference between the two groups is more nuanced. By applying a stricter 
definition of high-tech orders (see section 6.3), the results for all performance variables are 
qualitatively confirmed. 
Equations (2), (3) and (4) have also been estimated separately for high-tech and non-high-tech 
suppliers. The main results are briefly reported here. Equation (2) indicates that the increase in 
Intangible Assets after the procurement relationship is established occurs at high-tech companies 
only. The correlation between LHC procurement and number of patents (Equation 3) is positive and 
statistically significant in both groups. Finally, as regards productivity (Equation 4), while a 
positive and significant correlation between the CERN effect and sales per employee is obtained, 
when the two subsamples are regressed separately the correlation is no longer significant, probably 
owing to the considerable reduction in sample size. 
 
Table 6 – Revenues and Profitability: High tech vs. non high-tech companies 
 HT NHT HT NHT HT NHT 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆OR ∆OR ∆EBIT ∆EBIT ∆EBITm ∆EBITm 
CERN 36974.5*** 16512.8** 8631.3** -2034.0 0.552** 1.339 
 (7926.7) (6839.0) (3766.0) (2841.5) (0.241) (0.995) 
∆Total Assets (bln) 330974.6*** 962831.1* 23722.3*** 98216.5*** -0.233 1.862 
 (16063.6) (465746.7) (4588.8) (5953.9) (0.390) (2.110) 
       
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years*country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cons -41.82 -36200.6 -1695.0*** 7511.4*** 0.0562*** 5.105*** 
 (387.6) (27493.2) (156.7) (1298.2) (0.00984) (0.313) 
R2 0.017 0.019 0.581 0.511 0.131 0.276 
N 3703 2096 3706 2106 3687 2084 
FE regressions 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
5.4 Estimating the model as a system of simultaneous equations 
The present section illustrates the results that were obtained when our model was estimated as 
a system of simultaneous equations. The findings are consistent with those previously obtained 
from the single-regressions estimation, pointing out to the role of procurement in triggering the 
logical chain of implications that we aimed to test (Tables 7-9). Specifically, the coefficients 
obtained from the estimation of the system (6) highlight the direct “CERN effect” on R&D 
investments as well as its mediated impact on company innovation output, productivity and 
economic performance. 
It is important to note that the reduction in sample size with respect to the single-equation 
estimation is due to the fact that we are now considering all four outcome variables simultaneously, 
so the total number of missing observations increases (see footnote 6, section 3). 
For high-tech companies, the estimates clearly show that the impact of procurement on 
innovativeness comes by way of R&D, which in turn affects productivity, whose rise finally 
enhances the economic outcomes. 
For non-high-tech companies, by contrast, there is no positive influence of procurement on 
R&D and innovation output, suggesting that the significant association of productivity with 
revenues and profits that shows up in the final estimation stage is not driven by technological spill-
overs that boost technical know-how, but instead by such factors as market penetration and 
reputational gains.  
 
Table 7 – 3SLS estimation of the model in which the economic performance gauge is revenues  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FULL SAMPLE HIGH-TECH NON-HIGH-TECH 
∆R&D     
    
CERN 0.675*** 1.276*** -0.258 
 (0.050) (0.129) (0.387) 
∆Employees (mln) -0.0788 -0.0372 -0.125 
 (0.067) (0.085) (0.111) 
∆Tangible Assets (bln) -6.035*** -1.698*** 8.680 
 (0.484) (0.312) (12.270) 
    
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Cons -1.544 -25.79*** -1.158 
 (3.673) (4.090) (5.639) 
∆Patents    
    
∆R&D 7.532*** 4.006*** -0.109*** 
 (0.462) (0.330) (0.035) 
∆Employees (mln) 1.185*** 0.685*** -0.0163* 
 (0.099) (0.086) (0.009) 
∆Total Assets (bln) -4.347*** -2.203*** 0.513*** 
 (0.308) (0.221) (0.141) 
    
Macroeconomics controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Cons 9.256*** 105.0*** -0.400 
 (3.467) (9.057) (0.372) 
∆Productivity    
    
∆Patents 2881.1*** 2550.3*** 2866.6*** 
 (732.3) (731.4) (440.0) 
∆Employees (mln) -0.0482*** -0.0356*** -0.0511*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0117) (0.0128) 
∆Total Assets (bln) -20.57 -24.38 -118.7 
 (42.31) (42.36) (117.9) 
    
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Cons 63.54 -250.3 835.5** 
 (638.6) (803.4) (369.1) 
∆Revenues    
    
∆Productivity 348.3*** 392.7*** 3640.0*** 
 (42.28) (43.51) (816.5) 
∆Employees (mln) 69999.1*** 101865.1*** 136178.2*** 
 (2337.6) (3877.3) (22295.2) 
∆Total Assets (mln) 226.306*** 167.882*** 292.450** 
 (7.676) (9.360) (131.453) 
     
Macroeconomics controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Cons -39025.0 -64861.4 -96391.0 
 (101588.8) (139192.6) (261069.1) 
N 2850 1876 974 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 8 – 3SLS estimation of the model in which the economic performance gauge is EBIT 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FULL SAMPLE HIGH-TECH NON-HIGH-TECH 
∆R&D    
    
CERN 0.668*** 1.256*** -0.250 
 (0.050) (0.129) (0.398) 
∆Employees (mln) -0.0787 -0.0370 -0.125 
 (0.067) (0.085) (0.111) 
∆Tangible Assets (bln) -5.950*** -1.664*** 11.23 
 (0.482) (0.312) (12.37) 
    
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Cons -1.540 -25.79*** -1.089 
 (3.671) (4.090) (5.636) 
∆Patents    
    
∆R&D 7.446*** 3.956*** -0.102*** 
 (0.459) (0.330) (0.034) 
∆Employees (mln) 1.171*** 0.675*** -0.0152* 
 (0.099) (0.086) (0.009) 
∆Total Assets (bln) -4.290*** -2.170*** 0.506*** 
 (0.306) (0.220) (0.140) 
    
Macroeconomics controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
cons 9.142*** 103.7*** -0.384 
 (3.466) (9.051) (0.362) 
∆Productivity    
    
∆Patents 2848.6*** 2535.5*** 2815.7*** 
 (731.7) (731.2) (443.9) 
∆Employees (mln) -0.0491*** -0.0369*** -0.0510*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
∆Total Assets (bln) -15.52 -19.94 -113.0 
 (42.28) (42.35) (118.8) 
    
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
cons 57.26 -258.1 801.7** 
 (638.3) (803.4) (371.3) 
∆Revenues    
    
∆Productivity 209.6*** 221.2*** 211.7*** 
 (25.68) (30.16) (73.97) 
∆Employees (mln) 8739.2*** 16710.0*** 5434.3*** 
 (1415.5) (2678.4) (2015.8) 
∆Total Assets (mln) 21310.4*** 8888.5 62310.0*** 
 (4663.1) (6481.9) (11839.7) 
    
Macroeconomics controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Cons -1949.1 -11787.3 -9095.6 
 (61762.9) (96571.7) (23364.0) 
N 2852 1876 976 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table 9 – 3SLS estimation of the model in which the economic performance gauge is EBIT margin 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FULL SAMPLE HIGH-TECH NON-HIGH-TECH 
∆R&D    
    
CERN 0.723*** 1.346*** -0.365 
 (0.053) (0.138) (0.401) 
∆Employees (mln) -0.0788 -0.0374 -0.124 
 (0.067) (0.085) (0.112) 
∆Tangible Assets (bln) -5.945*** -1.660*** 9.342 
 (0.477) (0.319) (12.36) 
    
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
cons -1.588 -25.89*** -1.103 
 (3.677) (4.094) (5.651) 
∆Patents    
    
∆R&D 7.288*** 3.781*** -0.107*** 
 (0.443) (0.314) (0.035) 
∆Employees (mln) 1.141*** 0.641*** -0.0159* 
 (0.096) (0.081) (0.009) 
∆Total Assets (bln) -4.191*** -2.068*** 0.511*** 
 (0.295) (0.209) (0.141) 
    
Macroeconomics controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
cons 9.193*** 99.65*** -0.396 
 (3.399) (8.651) (0.367) 
∆Productivity    
    
∆Patents 2871.3*** 2515.0*** 2824.3*** 
 (735.2) (732.7) (434.0) 
∆Employees (mln) -0.0484*** -0.0354*** -0.0509*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
∆Total Assets (bln) -19.13 -22.95 -116.2 
 (42.45) (42.47) (116.2) 
    
Macroeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
cons 65.24 -244.3 816.2** 
 (640.6) (805.4) (364.2) 
∆Revenues    
    
∆Productivity 0.0027 0.0034* -0.0030 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.016) 
∆Employees (mln) 0.0881 0.347** -0.183 
 (0.099) (0.159) (0.445) 
∆Total Assets (mln) -0.270 -0.677* 0.774 
 (0.324) (0.382) (2.614) 
    
Macroeconomics controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
Cons -2.430 -2.446 1.802 
 (4.282) (5.685) (5.124) 
N 2839 1869 970 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
6. Robustness checks 
6.1 Alternative estimation methods 
Although the Hausman test suggested the use of an FE estimator for most of our regressions18, 
we also estimated equations (2), (4) and (5) using a Random Effect (RE) estimator, to check for 
robustness to alternative estimation techniques. The latter method also allows the use not only of 
time-varying but also of time-invariant controls such as industry and country-fixed effects, which 
                                                          
18 The Hausman Test always rejects the null (RE consistent and efficient) in revenue and productivity regressions and in most of the specifications of 
EBIT and EBIT margin regressions. It never rejects the null in knowledge production regressions. As FE is the preferred model in most cases, for 
more uniformed expositions we first presented the results of all FE regressions and then, as a robustness check, the RE estimates.  
may influence firm R&D investment and economic performance. As regards innovation equation 
(3), we tested robustness by using Poisson instead of Negative Binomial regression.  
For the most part, our results are confirmed in both coefficient magnitude and statistical 
significance (see Tables A1-A4 in the Appendix). The sole exception is specification (4) of the 
knowledge equation (Table A1, Appendix), where if the Tangible Fixed Assets variable (normalised 
by the number of employees) is used as a size control, the positive coefficient of the CERN effect 
loses its statistical significance. 
We also estimated equations (2), (4) and (5) by simple pooled OLS regressions, with and 
without firm-fixed effects. The results (not reported here for reasons of space) confirm that after 
becoming LHC suppliers companies exhibit, on average, increases in intangible assets and gains in 
both productivity and profitability. 
As to the innovation equation (3), Table A2 in the Appendix shows again that the findings are 
not affected by the estimation method.  
 
6.2 Dynamics 
For regression models (2)-(4), we also tested dynamic specifications with lagged outcome 
variables as an additional control. This procedure accounts for possible time trends that might 
persist even after controlling for macroeconomic variables and is generally advisable when effect 
persistency may be hypothesised (see e.g. Verbeek, 2012, p. 396). We are aware, however, that in 
the absence of proper instruments, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor may 
pose problems of endogeneity due to its correlation with the random error term. Once again, 
however, the results were qualitatively consistent with those of the static models, with only 
marginal changes in coefficient magnitudes, suggesting that the shift to dynamic specifications does 
not give rise to substantial endogeneity issues in our setting. The estimates are reported in Tables 
A5 and A6 in the Appendix. Past changes in profit margin, EBIT, intangible assets and productivity 
are inversely and very significantly correlated with their current values, suggesting a smoothing 
process over time. On the other hand, past changes in revenue and patent filings are positively 
correlated with their current values, suggesting inertia in firms’ revenue and propensity to innovate. 
6.3 Alternative classification of high-tech orders and alternative definition of high-tech suppliers 
To check the robustness of the estimates in Table 6, we applied a stricter standard to classify 
orders as “high-tech”, namely a technology intensity score of at least 4. Only 22.3% of the sample is 
now qualified as “high-tech,” but despite this drastic alteration of the proportions of high- and low-
tech groups, the results are only marginally affected. LHC procurement is found to have a positive 
and significant impact on high-tech suppliers’ EBIT, revenue and EBIT margin. Coefficient 
magnitudes are considerably greater than when orders with a technology intensity score of 3 are 
included. This result can be read as indicating that the more technologically complex the received 
order is, the higher the return to the supplier. However, as concerns the stricter definition, we also 
found a significant impact on the revenue of non-high-tech suppliers (perhaps a reputation effect). 
We applied another, more restrictive, classification of companies in the high-tech group: only 
firms whose high-tech orders make up more than 50% of their total received orders may be 
considered high-tech companies. According to this new definition, 58% of our sample suppliers are 
classified as high-tech. All of our results are confirmed in magnitude and significance level, both 
for the entire sample and for the high-tech subsample (the impact on revenue and EBIT is slightly 
greater, that on EBIT margin smaller). For the non-high-tech group, revenue and EBIT are not 
affected in a statistically significant way, while the effect on EBIT margin becomes significant at 
the 10% level (p-value=0.052). 
 
7.  Discussion and concluding remarks  
There are various reasons why one organisation may need another to supply an input, rather 
than producing it internally: time constraints,  lack of production capacity, lack of know-how, need 
to master the production process beyond prototyping, uncertainty concerning actual production 
costs, strategic focus on certain markets, and so on. Therefore, the procurement relationship may or 
may not create learning opportunities for the supplier. If the customer wants to buy a standard, “off-
the-shelf” product in relatively limited quantities, the learning opportunity is negligible, as there is 
no need to design or adopt any new technology. But where the customer requires substantial quality 
improvement to the supplier’s product or a massive increase in quantity, the Arrow–Solow 
mechanism, as discussed in section 2.1, would lead to a possible learning process, hence increased 
R&D, innovation, productivity and  profitability. 
A basic research infrastructure project typically requires two sets of tangible assets: those 
needed for the infrastructure itself – say, a particle accelerator – and those needed to exploit 
experimental data, such as detectors and information technology. In either case, the entity that 
manages the research infrastructure may need external firms to supply such assets. After 
construction, there may still be procurement relationships for operation and maintenance. The 
literature cited in section 2.3 makes it abundantly clear that procurement by large-scale research 
infrastructures (“Big Science”) can generate learning effects and innovation. The mechanism is 
similar, but not identical, to that found in high-tech industries such as the production of airframes 
(see Eliasson 2010, 2011) mentioned by Arrow (1962) and discussed in greater detail by Solow 
(1997). Some aspects of the discontinuity are closer to Pisano’s “learning-before-doing” concept 
(1996).  
The main specificity here is that in most cases the procurement contract between research 
infrastructure and supplier involves organisations with different fundamental objectives: profit 
maximisation, certainly, for the supplier, but not for basic research organisations like CERN, 
NASA, the European Space Agency and several other institutions. While the latter need to be cost-
effective, given their budget constraints, their fundamental objective is to maximise knowledge 
without gaining a profit. Hence the owners of these structures do not have the usual incentive to 
appropriate the rents from invention and innovation. For example, they tend not to protect their 
discoveries by patenting, even when this is practicable and would be profitable. As a consequence, 
in the procurement relationship, these institutions will generally pay a reasonable price to the firm 
for the input and will usually not seek compensation for any knowledge spillover that may occur. 
Moreover, as by definition the research institution wants to discover something previously 
unknown, it is likely that at least a part of the necessary tangible and intangible assets will consist in 
entirely new products or substantial improvements to existing ones, or else will have to be produced 
on an unprecedented scale or with enormously greater precision. Thus, in this context, there is a 
twofold mechanism for positive externality: the nature of the assets required by the research 
infrastructure and its disinterest in appropriating any rent that may arise from learning. The 
suppliers, instead, being profit maximisers, will take advantage of the asymmetry of objectives and 
seek to gain a profit from what they have been able to learn in the longer term.  
To test this thesis, we investigated the impact of procurement by means of a very large-scale 
research infrastructure, CERN’s Large Hadron Collider, on the companies involved in the supply 
chain. Specifically, we wanted to assess whether procurement may enhance economic performance 
by triggering a chain of events: becoming a CERN supplier increases R&D effort and innovative 
capacity, which in turn boosts labour productivity, ultimately increasing revenue and profitability. 
We found a positive and statistically significant correlation over time between procurement 
events and each of the outcome variables we considered, while controlling for observable firm 
characteristics and macroeconomic conditions, as well as for unobserved time, country, industry 
and firm-level fixed effects. After becoming suppliers, companies generally experienced a rise in 
intangible assets per employee (our proxy for R&D effort) and in annual patent filings (our proxy 
for innovation). Labour productivity, proxied by sales per employee, also increased, as did 
revenues, EBIT and EBIT margin. The results are confirmed both by estimating single-equation 
regression models and a system of simultaneous equations.  
These findings are consistent with the qualitative insights of Autio et al. (2003) and Florio et 
al. (2017). The latter reports the results of the broadest and most recent survey of CERN suppliers. 
Three types of outcome stem from suppliers’ cooperation with CERN: innovation (development of 
new products, services and technologies), learning (acquisition of technical know-how, 
improvement in the quality of products and services, changes in production processes) and market 
penetration (acquisition of new customers and market benefits due to reputational gains). These 
outcomes represent “intermediate outputs” which in turn impact on suppliers’ economic 
performance. Our findings on suppliers’ development activities and profits were broadly consistent 
with those results, but our approach is entirely novel. This is the first attempt to measure the 
procurement effect of Big Science quantitatively by using publicly available company reports rather 
than surveys, thus precluding subjective bias of the respondents. Moreover, unlike case studies and 
surveys, our method is replicable whenever the research infrastructure discloses the identity of its 
suppliers, the dates in which the orders are made, and the kind of product requested. And as far as 
we know, our paper offers the first empirical analysis of the effect that procurement by a basic 
research infrastructure may have on the number of patents filed by suppliers, along the lines of 
some of the literature on the effects of university research (section 2.2).   
Two potentially relevant issues are not dealt with in our study. First of all, we did not look at 
the survival of supplier firms: some companies may have gone bankrupt during the period 
considered and were therefore not included in the sample. The same goes for suppliers’ 
attractiveness of entry. Second, the availability of financial information in the Orbis/Amadeus 
databases determined the size and the composition of our sample, which as a result might not be 
randomly selected. Since our dataset does not allow taking these issues into account, they have been 
left for future research. 
Our findings indicate the existence of important learning spillovers from large-scale basic 
research infrastructures to their technology suppliers and suggest that the learning process that is 
generated by procurement is likely to lead to product and process innovation and ultimately higher 
profitability for high-tech firms. Generic reputational effects would appear to be less substantial, as 
there is no - or at best modest in some models - correlation over time between procurement events 
and non-high-tech suppliers’ revenue, profit or profit margin. If the data had indicated an equally 
significant “CERN effect” for firms involved in non-high-tech procurement, our findings could 
have been interpreted as reflecting, above all, a generic signaling or reputational effect, thus 
increasing market opportunities or permitting the firm to charge higher prices. Of course, we cannot 
rule out reputational effects or other marketing drivers for high-tech firms as well: advertising their 
capability to handle the demanding requirements of LHC technology could well constitute a 
persuasive marketing argument. This combination of innovation and reputational effects is, after all, 
exactly what previous narratives and surveys would have suggested.  
These findings carry two implications for science policy. First, it would be helpful if 
publicly funded institutions that operate research infrastructures made the information on their 
procurement available for independent inquiry, as CERN did for us. Matching these data with the 
long-term economic and financial data of the firms in the supply chain and with their patent filings 
would appear to be both feasible and fruitful.  
Second, governments and funding agencies should realise that an appreciable part of 
taxpayers’ money is returned to society in the form of increased profits for high-tech firms, 
particularly for innovative SMEs (Libaers et al., 2010): around 75% of CERN suppliers in our 
sample include fewer than 250 employees. Obviously, this consideration abstracts from potential 
issues related to competition in supplier markets, such as concentration and market power, which 
should be investigated in further research. 
Conceivably, in some distant future scientists and engineers may find some practical application for 
the Higgs boson; however, market responses to investments in science are observable on a much 
shorter horizon (a decade or so for the median order during the construction of the LHC). These 
responses are mediated by high-tech firms involved in the procurement process, and in principle, 
the economic impact can be quantified. Obviously, there are other important channels for the 
propagation of the social benefits of Big Science, such as human capital and cultural effects (Martin 
and Irvine, 2001; Florio et al., 2016) or technology transfer (Nielsen and Anelli, 2016). We do not 
claim that all large-scale research infrastructure projects can be justified by means of technological 
procurement spillovers alone, but it is worthwhile to record their benefits systematically and 
measure them against investment costs. 
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 Appendix 
 
Correlation matrix 
 
 
CERN Empl. Total 
Assets 
Tang. 
Fixed 
Assets 
Int. 
Fixed 
Assets 
Patents Sales Rev. EBIT EBIT 
margin 
GDP  
growth 
CPI 
             CERN 1.000 
           Employees 0.120 1.000 
          Total Assets 0.115 0.890 1.000 
         Tang. Fix. Assets 0.032 0.244 0.388 1.000 
        Intang. Fix. Assets 0.046 0.268 0.430 0.723 1.000 
       Patents 0.057 0.449 0.390 0.101 0.063 1.000 
      Sales 0.124 0.960 0.932 0.365 0.380 0.450 1.000 
     Revenues 0.124 0.962 0.931 0.366 0.380 0.452 0.998 1.000 
    EBIT 0.084 0.570 0.676 0.549 0.398 0.041 0.668 0.669 1.000 
   EBIT margin 0.012 -0.006 0.003 0.039 0.015 0.020 0.006 0.005 0.105 1.000 
  GDP growth 0.221 0.047 0.058 0.051 0.102 -0.031 0.059 0.059 0.057 0.058 1.000 
 CPI 0.017 -0.042 -0.037 -0.005 -0.007 -0.012 -0.041 -0.041 -0.028 -0.031 -0.241 1.000 
 
 
Table A1 – Impact of CERN procurement on R&D effort, RE regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 ∆R&D ∆R&D ∆R&D ∆R&D 
CERN 0.575*** 0.741*** 0.898*** 0.0749 
 (0.147) (0.216) (0.189) (0.162) 
∆Employees (mln) -1.93*** -1.93*** -1.95*** -0.0114 
 (0.126) (0.130) (0.125) (0.0308) 
∆TFA/Employees (mln)    0.0321 
    (0.0449) 
size_very_large 1.026** 1.020*** 1.129***  
 (0.416) (0.341) (0.368)  
size_large 0.342 0.348 0.242  
 (0.692) (0.630) (0.645)  
size_medium 0.137 0.136 0.0599  
 (0.736) (0.701) (0.800)  
     
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years No Yes Yes Yes 
Years*Country No No Yes Yes 
     
Cons -1.010* -0.882 -2.609*** -2.777*** 
 (0.563) (0.601) (0.705) (0.246) 
R2 0.085 0.085 0.094 0.020 
N 3893 3893 3893 3488 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 Table A2 – Impact of CERN procurement on innovation output, Poisson Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Patents 
         
CERN 0.305 0.493** 0.485** 0.689*** 0.494** 0.726*** 0.482** 0.685*** 
 (0.239) (0.248) (0.211) (0.220) (0.224) (0.238) (0.211) (0.219) 
∆Employees (mln) -0.0447 -0.0803** -0.0460 -0.0874** -0.0435 -0.0811* -0.0463 -0.0876** 
 (0.0289) (0.0404) (0.0294) (0.0401) (0.0296) (0.0430) (0.0294) (0.0440) 
∆Total Assets (bln)  0.129  0.150  0.111  0.150 
  (0.146)  (0.191)  (0.213)  (0.190) 
size_very_large 4.424***  4.243***  4.144***  4.250***  
 (1.004)  (1.004)  (1.008)  (1.004)  
size_large 2.983***  2.801***  2.663***  2.812***  
 (1.003)  (1.004)  (1.009)  (1.005)  
size_medium 1.458  1.344  1.151  1.347  
 (1.010)  (1.011)  (1.016)  (1.004)  
∆(IA/TA)   2.498*** 3.852***   2.500*** 3.857*** 
   (0.568) (0.766)   (0.564) (0.764) 
∆(IA/TA)_lag1     0.533 1.261   
     (1.334) (1.864)   
GDP_growth 0.0357 0.0763 0.0780 0.122** 0.0741 0.123** 0.0792 0.123** 
 (0.0538) (0.0486) (0.0544) (0.0482) (0.0573) (0.0498) (0.0541) (0.0481) 
         
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No No No Yes Yes 
         
Cons -3.924*** -1.043 -3.727*** -1.231 -20.73 -17.94 -3.737*** -1.233 
 (1.452) (1.089) (1.431) (1.090) (24.25) (16.87) (1.433) (1.091) 
N 5278 5278 4660 4660 4326 4325 4660 4660 
Column (6): fixed effects controls using the Blundell et al. (1999) pre-sample mean scaling estimator. 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
Table A3  – Impact of CERN procurement on productivity, RE regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆Productivity ∆Productivity ∆Productivity ∆Productivity ∆Productivity ∆Productivity 
CERN 8.321 5.716 13.11*** 9.932*** 13.02*** 9.773*** 
 (5.776) (5.137) (2.057) (3.570) (2.009) (3.568) 
∆Employees (mln) -20.62*** -19.91*** -17.67*** -17.63*** -17.69*** -17.66*** 
 (1.440) (0.789) (1.177) (1.369) (1.175) (1.379) 
∆Total Assets (bln) 8.607  1.905  1.930  
 (15.00)  (12.82)  (12.85)  
size_very_large  27.56*  15.05**  16.06*** 
  (14.07)  (6.563)  (5.906) 
size_large  35.90*  22.32***  23.17*** 
  (20.26)  (7.445)  (7.247) 
size_medium  -17.83  -13.97  -13.24 
  (19.41)  (18.81)  (18.56) 
∆R&D   0.784** 0.775* 0.776** 0.767* 
   (0.378) (0.422) (0.382) (0.427) 
∆(Patents/Empl)     88.86*** 91.68*** 
     (24.65) (25.57) 
       
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years*country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cons -73.31*** -103.0*** -60.08*** -88.77*** -69.22*** -97.77*** 
 (8.725) (24.30) (7.813) (17.67) (8.971) (17.54) 
R2 0.338 0.339 0.379 0.381 0.379 0.381 
N 3659 3659 3328 3328 3320 3320 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table A4 – Impact of CERN procurement on economic outcomes: Revenues, EBIT and EBIT 
margin, RE regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ∆OR ∆OR ∆EBIT ∆EBIT ∆EBITm ∆EBITm 
CERN 29860.7*** 47589.1** 3387.9* 5012.0*** 0.442* 0.421* 
 (9280.5) (21057.3) (1782.5) (1864.0) (0.257) (0.256) 
∆Total Assets (bln) 356622.2***  25152.1***  -0.190  
 (14886.6)  (4759.2)  (0.329)  
size_very_large  24026.0***  560.9  1.389 
  (6050.8)  (1754.3)  (0.955) 
size_large  -563.3  2791.8  1.428* 
  (3284.9)  (2540.4)  (0.842) 
size_medium  -1561.6  1021.5  1.567 
  (2291.5)  (703.9)  (0.977) 
       
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sector  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years*country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Cons -95195.8*** -116777.5*** 44025.1*** 44341.3*** -9.838*** -11.18*** 
 (14861.4) (26325.2) (1505.7) (2863.4) (0.900) (0.916) 
R2 0.540 0.121 0.146 0.127 0.098 0.099 
N 5799 5799 5812 5812 5771 5771 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
Table A5 - Impact of CERN procurement on R&D, innovation outcome and productivity, dynamic 
specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆R&D ∆Patents ∆Productivity 
CERN 0.501*** 0.533*** 16.03* 
 (0.166) (0.091) (7.558) 
∆R&D_lag1 -0.174***   
 (0.017)   
∆Patents_lag1  0.129***  
  (0.007)  
∆Productivity_lag1   -0.475*** 
   (0.137) 
    
Firm-level controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country (§) Yes (§) 
Sector (§) Yes (§) 
Years Yes Yes Yes 
Years*Country Yes No Yes 
    
Cons -0.776*** -40.93*** 73.17*** 
 (0.1000) (14.49) (1.707) 
R2 0.010 n.a. 0.157 
N 2899 5488 2790 
Columns (1) and (3): FE regressions 
(§) Country and sector fixed effects omitted in FE regressions 
Column (2): Negative Binomial Regression 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Table A6 – Impact of CERN procurement on Revenues, EBIT and EBIT margin, dynamic specifications 
 FULL SAMPLE HIGH-TECH NON HIGH-TECH 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 ∆OR ∆EBIT ∆EBITm ∆OR ∆EBIT ∆EBITm ∆OR ∆EBIT ∆EBITm 
CERN 28720.5*** 4019.3** 1.064*** 34596.3*** 6656.8** 0.945*** 14937.4* -1758.9 1.179** 
 (6982.3) (1838.5) (0.228) (6579.5) (2369.7) (0.252) (7606.7) (2674.5) (0.444) 
∆EBITm_lag1   -0.367***   -0.364***   -0.370*** 
   (0.0275)   (0.0448)   (0.0314) 
∆OR_lag1 0.103***   0.0875***   0.155   
 (0.0182)   (0.0202)   (0.161)   
∆EBIT_lag1  -0.155***   -0.159***   -0.0895  
  (0.0494)   (0.0499)   (0.213)  
∆Total Assets 
(bln) 
337462*** 26191.3*** -0.0993 328555*** 24664.7*** -0.180 927069.6* 99755.1*** 2.300 
 (14777.4) (5017.1) (0.238) (15337.9) (4747.6) (0.269) (478396.3) (14560.2) (2.765) 
          
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years*Country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Cons -23480*** -3081.5*** 0.0632* -9470.6*** -1510.2*** 1.016*** -6459.5** 1136.0*** -1.996*** 
 (432.9) (170.9) (0.0330) (479.4) (88.51) (0.0861) (2321.4) (204.2) (0.100) 
R2 0.491 0.117 0.080 0.599 0.136 0.040 0.540 0.538 0.179 
N 5340 5359 5295 3406 3415 3382 1934 1944 1913 
FE regressions 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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